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CAN VENTURE CAPITAL FOSTER INNOVATION?  
A STUDY OF THE COUPLING BETWEEN INNOVATION AND FINANCE 
  
Kevin LEVILLAIN, Blanche SEGRESTIN, Armand HATCHUEL
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Venture Capital is recognized to be a key link in the complex chain of financing for young 
innovative firms. By helping them at critical stages of innovation development, it would help 
an economy to leverage its public research and sustain its growth. However, recent research 
reveals that the performance of VC funds, both internal (profitability) and external (growth), 
does not reach the expectations. In this paper, we aim at explaining this paradox and 
suggesting new patterns to articulate venture capital and innovation management. We build 
upon the literature on VC to show that the theoretical model of VC does not take the 
management of innovation into account, and makes unrealistic assumptions on the 
composition of project portfolios. Conversely, based on interviews with some VC funds 
managers, we show that actual funds can invent alternative management models, for example 
based on the structuration of ecosystems for the start-ups, the development of "external 
valuation" mechanisms, or the creation of synergies between financed projects.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I.A. Context of the research 
For a few decades, venture capital has been considered to be a promising mechanism to 
support innovation and growth (Gompers & Lerner, 2001), notably in public policies. It is 
indeed supposed to address the “equity gap” that penalizes innovative start-ups by providing 
financing and tools to accompany the first stages of innovation (Florida et Kenney, 1988). 
The start-ups backed by VC would be more innovative than the others (Kortum et Lerner, 
2000), and leading companies would then invest in corporate venture to develop their 
                                                
1 The authors are grateful to the CDC Entreprises for its support in this research.  
innovative capabilities (Engel, 2011) (Birkinshaw et al., 2002). It has also become a means 
for public policy to foster some technological or environmental transitions (eg. Cleantech) 
(Hargadon et Kenney, 2012).  
However, recent research reveals that the profitability of venture capital funds is rather low 
(Mulcahy et 2012) and that their impact on innovation is more uncertain than expected 
(Mason et Harrison, 2002), thus putting the model of venture capital itself into question. 
This raises the opportunity to review the canonical model of venture capital as presented by 
the economic and management literature, to exhibit its major assumptions and to assess 
whether these assumptions have been verified in practice for the past decades. As a 
mechanism to foster innovation for young firms in highly technological and capital-intensive 
sectors, we also think that it is of interest to question whether this model takes recent 
advances in innovation management into account, or whether it is a mostly finance-based 
model that does not try to couple with a representation of innovation processes. 
I.B. Methodology and Research Questions 
Hence our two research questions: 
1. What are the theoretical models behind venture capital rationale? How to explain 
their failure? 
2. To which model of innovation management is this rationale coupled? 
We organize our research setting in three steps. First, based on the founding literature on 
the organization of Venture Capital, we characterize the expected behavior and functioning of 
the average Venture Capital fund and compare it to the recent advances of literature in 
innovation management. With this data, we build a theoretical model of VC in which the 
grounding hypotheses to ensure its success are made clear. Our first result is to show that this 
model, mainly directed towards risk management only, does not take into account the 
management of innovation itself. Indeed, beyond the classical syndication and diversification 
of portfolio, models of venture capital often refer to real options management (van Putten et 
MacMillan, 2004; Wadhwa et Basu, 2013). And a lot of criteria, selection logics and coaching 
or monitoring instruments are presented in the literature (Freeman et Engel, 2007) (Kortum et 
Lerner, 2000). But our analysis reveals that they generally do not really take into account 
neither the specificity of radical innovation (Colarelli O'Connor et Rice, 2001; Leifer et al., 
2000) nor the managerial levers for creative design (Hatchuel et Weil, 2009), and consider 
most of the time the essential features of the start-up as exogenous variables.   
 Second, based on a more critical current of the literature on VC and its actual 
performance, we further characterize the limits of the average model by highlighting its flaws, 
especially due to the fact that some of the major grounding assumptions cannot be verified in 
practice. Indeed, venture cap is based on logic of risks diversification, which should suppose 
that funds finance a high number of independent and high-potential start-ups (Bengtsson, 
2011). Yet, the financing schemes of the funds themselves lead to cut radically the number of 
potential candidates that experts examine, raise the capital invested in each project, and target 
sectors that funds know best. Besides, statistical studies have shown that the probability of 
very high success (e.g. x10) is too low to sustain this diversification model. 
Lastly, we conduct semi-structured interviews with 9 managers of French venture capital 
funds, in diverse sectors (e.g. pharmaceuticals, entertainment, tourism, etc.) to balance the 
theoretical model with an investigation on the actual functioning of some venture capital 
funds. We show that, compared to the expected behavior according to the theoretical model, 
managers of VC funds can actually reflect on an implicit model of innovation management 
and play on some variables, such as the probability of success or the value of the projects. We 
identify original ways VC funds use to couple financing decisions and innovation 
management. For instance, we observe how VC funds can build on the absence of 
independence between start-ups to foster the development of a synergistic ecosystem. We also 
identify that VC funds play on the “external value” of the project by actively exploring, 
through adequate corporate alliances, companies whose capabilities could be the most 
expanded by the project. We thus claim that our analysis can contribute to a more grounded 
model of VC logics, with actionable methods both for founders and investors of start-ups.  
 
II. THE CLASSICAL STRUCTURE OF VENTURE CAP PORTFOLIOS 
According to the literature, private equity investment (and more especially seed funding 
and venture capital) aims at bridging an identified “equity gap” between the available 
investment funds and the needs of young firms (and in particular capital-intensive 
technological start-ups) for stable financing. 
Conventional investment does not indeed distribute equitably along all the development 
phases of the firms. Front-end phases of start-up development are notably the riskiest 
(Macmillan 1931), which should entail a higher remuneration of the capital (“risk premium”) 
than conventional schemes. They also require a higher illiquidity than most other investments, 
given the time needed for young start-ups to reach profitability or, if applicable, an 
appropriate selling value. This also entails an “illiquidity premium” that adds to the first one. 
The economic consequence of this observed equity gap is the undervaluing of research 
outputs, especially public research outputs, and consequently a negative influence on 
economic growth. This analysis justifies the common emphasis put on the role of the States to 
bridge this gap, especially because New Technology-Based Fimrs (NTBF) are pivotal actors 
in the modern technological transitions. Regarding public policy, private equity investment 
has also become a means to leverage the development of innovative sectors with strong social 
or environmental impact. Through the participation to specialized funds, States may for 
example contribute to the development of sectors such as “Clean Technologies”.  
Historically, the support of the States became necessary given the importance of the 
financing of start-ups to boost competitiveness and growth, and also to contribute to the 
promotion of (public) research. This can be seen through the creation of specific tax-favored 
statutes, and new guarantees. 
 
II.A. Institutional structure: General and Limited partners 
The capital investment is born in the United States. In 1958, the Small Business 
Investment Act codifies the rules of the U.S. financial and tax advantages granted to the 
venture capitalists who invest in new projects and accompany entrepreneurs until these 
projects become profitable. But the first "professional" investment structures were already 
recognized in the United States since 1940 (Investment Company Act). The first funds to be 
established, just after the war, were legally partnerships with public shares that could easily 
be exchanged. So was the famous ARDC (American Research Development Corporation) 
founded by General Doriot. 
However, the difficulties created by the volatility of investors, who did not always remain 
involved for the expected period, led subsequently to promote the so-called “closed” funds. 
After the first introduced SBIC ("Small Business Investment Companies"), in 1957, it has 
been the "Limited Partnership" that spread the most in the common law countries. Its model is 
as follows: 
• A fund is usually established as a Limited Partnership for a limited time (usually 10 
years). Investors (called Limited Partners, LPs thereafter) own the majority of the shares 
(more than 90%) but do not take investment choices nor decisions about the management of 
ventures. In return, their liability is limited, unlike that of the General Partners. 
• Conversely, the General Partners (GPs) own only a small amount of capital, but are 
being entrusted with the management. They are paid in two ways (“2-20 rule”): they earn a 
2% commission on the funds raised upon the LPs and 20% of the generated profit, if any 
(Bengtsson, 2011). 
• Funding is done by conditional steps and funds often work by "syndicating", which 
allows the pooling of risks and also promote learning (Ferrary, 2010). 
 
II.B. Underlying hypotheses of the classical model 
Based on these general principles, private equity investment requires the description of a 
few additional hypotheses to understand the financing rationale with a rather simple model: 
 
Hypothesis 1 – Investments are independent from each other. 
VC funds follow classic principles of risk management: they aim at building diversified 
portfolios of projects, which decreases the overall risk of the entire portfolio. This assumes 
that the possible projects of start-ups to be funded follow an initial structure of independence. 
According to this hypothesis, the success of some of the projects compensates the failure of 
the others. Each VC fund would then have an incentive to maximize the number of funded 
projects, and to reduce its share in each. 
 
Hypothesis 2 – There is a sustainable probability for projects with high potential (the 
"gold nuggets") 
The profitability of the VC funds relies on the assumption that even if the majority of the 
funded start-ups might result in an economic failure, there is a certain amount of them that 
will succeed with a “multiple” high enough to cover the losses.  In other words, there is a 
hypothesis that every funded start-up has a certain probability – admittedly low, but high 
enough – to reveal a very high potential value (at least ten times the initial investment), thus 
making the financing operation globally sustainable. 
This should help motivating management teams: the GPs are indeed typically paid on the 
“2-20” rule: they keep 20% of the generated profit. This clearly encourages them to maximize 
the capital gain. More especially, it is the potential capital gain on the resale of the shares (or 
the gain through IPO) that is supposed to be attractive, and notably high enough to 
statistically compensate projects that fail. 
 
Hypothesis 3 – VC funds have the capability to make their investment progressively more 
reliable by learning about the probability of success of projects they support within their 
ecosystems. 
Start-ups have a probability of success that is a priori unknown. But the model of VC 
relies on the idea that if the funds can not act to change this probability, it is however possible 
to conduct increasingly accurate investigations to establish presumptions of success or failure, 
and therefore more reliable investment: 
• Investment in a start-up is analysed through the principle of real options. Following a 
first round of investment with small amounts, aiming at create on “option” to further 
invest, the more information is gathered on the investment project, the more the risks 
become clear. The investors then have the opportunity to invest, if they wish, for a 
second round. This model of "options" has notably inspired investment logics in large 
enterprises (Battistini et al., 2013). 
• Besides, the main role of the GPs is to follow the "Due Diligence", which is the 
required research and control of information to help them having a sound judgment on 
the activity, financial situation, results, development perspectives and organization of 
the funded enterprises. In other words, the GPs are responsible for seeking information 
needed for the evaluation and control of start- ups and their business plans. In 
addition, they provide resources and custom-made monitoring for start-ups teams. 
Literature showed that there exist diverse profiles of venture cap investors: human-
based, financial or technological... (Knockaert et al., 2010). But the hypothesis 
remains nonetheless that the probability of success is intrinsic to the project, or in 
other words “exogenous” to the work of the GPs. It is worth noting that this 
competence of selection and monitoring is the one to be valued by investors (LPs) in 
their choice of GPs teams to whom they entrust their funds. 
 
III. THE LIMITS OF THE MODEL 
III.A. Does this Venture Capital model really foster innovation? 
There is a growing consensus in the literature over the demonstration that large industrial 
groups do not support themselves the renewal of their products and technologies. Their 
processes of risk management and NPD contribute on the contrary to prevent disruptions and 
radical innovations. Conversely, start-ups backed by venture capital funds are deemed to be 
more innovative and job-creating than others small or large firms. Incidentally, some large 
companies draw their inspiration from this model to develop their own investment capabilities 
(Engel, 2011). 
More generally, Venture Capital is seen as a new model for specific innovation, which is 
neither that of the company or of the entrepreneur: according to Florida, VCs would provide a 
"gatekeeping function". The development paths being generally constrained and dependent on 
institutional and social contexts, technological breakthroughs would then contribute to open 
new blank design spaces. By gathering information on these new design spaces in an 
organized way, VC would then help developing these new potentials. They support the 
creation of companies and the required investments to overcome technical frontiers. At the 
end of the day, their choices would then steer the socio-technical trajectories and sow the 
seeds and create appropriate conditions for future developments (Florida et Kenney, 1988). 
In addition, several studies have sought to show that statistically, VC backed firms were 
more innovative, especially in terms of number of patents filed. Thus, for (Kortum et Lerner, 
2000): 
"Focusing on a conservative middle ground, a dollar of venture capital 
appears to be about three times more potent in stimulating patenting than a dollar 
of traditional corporate R&D. Our estimates therefore suggest that venture 
capital, even though it averaged less than 3 % of corporate R&D from 1983 to 
1992, is responsible for a much greater share – about 8% – of U.S. industrial 
innovations in this decade." 
 
These figures are yet to be taken with caution: it should be noted that a third variable 
might mediate this relationship. VC operations generally occur where major technological 
breakthroughs have recently emerged, which may explain the unusual frequency of patents 
(Gompers et al., 2009). 
Beyond any doubts that we can raise about the ability of VC backed firms to file more 
patent than corporate R&D, there are several other issues that worsen the picture: our analysis 
shows that the results of private equity investment remain desperately low, be it in terms of 
economic growth, or even in terms of return on investment (profitability). 
 
III.B. Private equity investment only partially resolves the "equity gap" 
Although private equity is deemed to bridge the equity gap by providing financing 
solutions where usual funding is insufficient, biases in the selection of companies are both 
remarkable and detrimental. 
First, to qualify for very high yields, investors privilege start-ups whose technologies 
have applications for very large and rapidly deployable markets. Hence a preference for 
applications whose markets are clearly identified, mostly B2C, and, as Hargadon emphasizes 
it, “scalable” and with “rapid pay-off” (Hargadon et Kenney, 2012). Typically, VC investors 
prefer applications in digital technologies, software, or biotech to application in more heavy 
industrial fields. Consequently, although Venture Capital was supposed to help investing in 
sectors with strong impacts (ecological transition, etc.), Clean Techs are for example excluded 
from the scope of its business. Indeed, the risks generated by a still unpredictable regulatory 
intervention are too strong, the willingness to pay of potential customers is too volatile, 
government support is a major factor, etc. 
Second, the rules of remuneration of GPs urge them to invest in a lower number of 
projects, with higher amounts. Indeed, insofar as each considered case requires due diligence 
and a strong analysis effort, while GPs earn a riskless 2% per year of the total volume of 
funds raised (independently from the number of projects in which these funds are distributed), 
the teams of analysts are not incited to increase the number of expensive tests for applicants. 
Over the average course of an investment cycle (about 10 years), GPs thus recover 20% of the 
initial funds, a riskless return that is quite comparable (if not higher) to the overall 20% 
uncertain return on generated profit (see below). Thus, for a given overall investment volume, 
the GP will prefer a small number of investments, with larger amounts, just the opposite of 
the diversification hypothesis on which the initial model was based. As a direct result, start-
ups asking for more funds at the beginning have paradoxically a greater chance of being 
supported by VC funds! 
 
III.C Venture Capital suffers from low financial returns 
In addition, venture capital funds do not achieve the levels of return on investment that 
were expected at their creation. According to the literature, this is due to the agency 
relationship between LPs and GPs, and precisely to the risk of opportunism thereof. More 
specifically, the proposed reasons for the low profitability are twofold: 
- Quite typically, the intermediary structure between LPs and GPs is criticized by the risk 
of opportunism that it generates. For example, the limited lifespan of the fund and the method 
of compensation for GPs lead to sub-optimal behaviours: instead of following the “real 
options” mechanism, projects that have passed the first round keep on being financed until the 
end of the fund so that GPs collect the annual 2% return, even when they have information 
showing that they have a high chance of filaure (Kandel et al., 2011). 
 
- More surprisingly, the behaviour of investors themselves is put in question: they seem 
to fall for promises of extraordinary profitability, and do not question counter-productive 
management rules. A recent report from the Kauffman Foundation, eloquently subtitled “We 
have met the enemy and he is us”, is a severe blow to the classical model (Mulcahy et 2012). 
According to this institutional investor, who has invested in hundreds of funds for years, the 
system has provided more than 20 billons dollars per year for 15 years, but was only 
marginally profitable compared to the financial markets. According to the report, this is 
because LPs have mandates to invest pre-determined amounts of cash. Therefore, they invest 
in volume on the whole, instead of case by case, thus including funds that are far from being 
top-performers. Furthermore, the evaluation criteria are misleading and inappropriate: 
• "Top quartile" or Internal Rate of Return are self-referencing criteria, which mean 
nothing on performance relative to the market 
• The myth of the J-Curve normally justifies the patience of investors, but lacks of 
evidence in practice... 
In addition, for every investment in advanced technological areas, venture capitalists are 
said to suffer a “double tyranny”: the first facet is the high degree of risk they face in nascent 
technological fields, and the second is the impossibility for funds to organize a true 
diversification of the portfolio, given the high level of expertise and specialization that each 
investment in such technological companies require (Murray et Marriott, 1998). 
 Nevertheless, the analysis of the financial results of VC calls for a deeper questioning: 
admittedly, according to studies, financial performance greatly varies depending on the 
chosen funds, and they emphasize the cyclical nature of performance. But more importantly, 
the results are highly dependent on the observation rule: they can be seen as extremely good if 
one only considers companies that have made an Initial Public Offering (IPO). According to 
Cochrane (2005): 
"The average return to IPO or acquisition is an astounding 698 %." However, "there are 
a few truly outstanding returns of thousands of percent and many more modest ( ≅ 100% )" 
(Cochrane, 2005). 
Cochrane insists on the bias of considering only listed companies: by definition, these are 
the cases where the highest return are expected (because the higher the company valuation, 
the greater the chance of an IPO). Once this bias is corrected, the “real” return is estimated at 
5.2 % per year. Which is significantly lower, and notably lower than the return of the S&P 
500 (15.7 %) and that of the average Management Buy-Out (17.6%) (Murray et Marriott, 
1998). 
These weak returns are confirmed by other studies, and statistics show that, despite some 
companies that are able to generate returns in the order of x10, the normal distribution of 
portfolios is overall too low to ensure the sustainability of venture capital. For instance, 
according to (Florida et al, 1988), surveys on the performance of 10 leader funds from 1972 
to 1983 show that over 525 investments, only 56 were "winners" (10.7%) and generated more 
than half (540 million of 823) of the portfolio’s value, and more than half of the investments 
(266) have hardly been profitable. According to (Mason et Harrison, 2002) a survey over 383 
investments harvested by 13 venture capital funds from 1969 to 1985 shows that only 6.8% of 
investments make x10 returns, against 60% that result in losses. Overall, “almost 50% of the 
total final value of the funds came from just 6.7% of investments.” 
 
IV. QUESTIONING THE FOUNDING HYPOTHESES OF VC 
This leads us to question the hypotheses at the base of VC: as we have seen, the model is 
based on the assumption that random “gold nuggets” are frequent enough to compensate the 
losses of the majority of projects. However, the analysis shows that the profitability of a 
couple of “golden” companies is in fact not sufficient to finance the investigation of a 
broad portfolio. 
In particular, if the highly successful projects only generate ten times the initial 
investment, then to be profitable VC funds would require that more than 7% of the population 




To summarize, there are two major contradictions in the initial model:  
- First, there is a contradiction of interests on the amounts of investments: LPs would 
benefit from increasing the number of projects (to reduce the average investment ticket) in 
order to diversify risks. GPs instead have an incentive to minimize the number of cases 
studied and selected.  
 
 
- The second contradiction comes from the insufficient frequency of profitable companies 
to justify a portfolio approach. 
 
Summary of the hypotheses and contradictions 
Parameters Classical model of Venture 
Cap Funds 
Practical functioning of VC 
Funds 
Size of portfolio of 
investment projects 
High amount of total 
investment 
High number of funded 
projects 
High amount of total 
investment as a whole 




Independent projects Projects treated as 
independent but in same 
technological domains 
Amount invested in 
each project  
Low and distributed High and concentrated (=> no 
real diversification) 
Probability of return 
on investment 
Exogenous Exogenous 
Probability of high 
return (x 10) 
High enough to reach 
profitability 
Thought to be high enough 
but limited in practice 
 
However, is this canonical model really the one that is followed by venture capitalists? 
As we have seen, this model is expressed in purely financial terms (classical risk 
management) and is not connected to any innovation rationale. We could wonder if, in 
practice, VCs do not have a different reasoning to select and support their investments. In 
particular, do they have means to:  
1) play with the probability distribution?  
2) or with the valuation of projects?  
3) Do not they also have other payment methods that avoid the bias shown above? 
 
V. EMPIRICAL ALTERNATIVES: COUPLING BETWEEN INNOVATION AND 
FINANCING 
At this point, it appears that the literature has not taken sufficient account of the practices, 
sometimes very different, of contrasting funds. Yet, our interviews shed light on interesting 
forms of coupling between the investment rationale of some VC funds and their management 
of innovation. We can give some first examples of these couplings, showing how they change 
the parameters of the classical model. 
 
V.A. A model of interdependence between projects and external valuation in the 
ecosystem: Innobio 
 
Innobio is a fund created by a French public actor in private equity (CDC Entreprises), 
which specializes in a specific area: the fund is positioned on "biotech products for health that 
enable considering collaborations with pharmaceutical companies". 
As a “sector fund”, we could have assumed that it undergoes the so-called “double 
tyranny”. But it actually takes advantage of a position on a particular field of innovation, 
where subscribers (LPs) are not just investors. These are big pharmaceutical companies (such 
as Sanofi, Merck, ...), that therefore meet to scrutinize various areas of innovation they can 
not handle alone. 
• Innobio has thus established a strategic committee, composed of experts from the 
different  pharmaceutical  companies.  Thanks  to  this  committee,  the  fund 
significantly increases its analysis capacity and its ability to monitor funded start‐
ups  (risk  and  innovation  analysis,  access  to  competences  etc.).  Therefore  it 
directly increases the probability of project success. 
• Then,  the  interest  for  the  LPs  is  not  limited  to  a  start‐up  project  in  particular: 
pharmaceutical  companies  in  fact  invest  in  the  fund  for  the  overall  strategic 
monitoring  it  allows  them  to  make.  One  can  then  talk  about  "cross  value"  or 
synergies,  insofar  as  the  value  of  investing  in  a  particular  company  in  fact 
influences the successes of the others. 
• Lastly,  Innobio  significantly  increases  the  value  of  start‐ups  by  playing  on  the 
"external"  valuation  factor.  Unlike  the  value  revealed  by  the  business  plan 
(typically,  expected  revenue  from  the  product  launch),  the  challenge  is  to 
promote the potential of start‐ups for the pharmaceutical companies themselves. 





In conclusion we can identify a first underlying model of innovation behind the rationale 
of Innobio. One can call it a model of venture cap with "cross value" and "external 
potentiation" effect. 
 
V.B. A model of "prudent broker" with focus on external valuation: Scientipole 
Initiatives 
Our second case, the fund named "Scientipole Initiatives" shows another configuration. 
 
“Evergreen” model 
First of all, the structure of the fund differs from the Limited Partnership with General 
and Limited Partners. Like the usual company, the equity to be invested in start-ups is the 
capital stock of the company, which is not separated in different “tickets” with expected 
investment duration. The fund thus invests directly, without distinguishing LP GP. It avoids 
the problem of the large number of investments and rather focuses on a “flow” of projects 
with limited involvement. 
 
“Prudential” model: 
Compared to traditional funds that select a few high return sectors, what furthers the 
“equity gap” for a whole part of the industry, “Scientipole Initiative” is not positioned on a 
specialized field, but plays more on the independence between projects. Indeed, the evergreen 
model and the research of varied industrial applications enable keeping low invested amounts 
per project, and guaranteeing the diversity required for a true risks portfolio management. 
Accordingly, it does not look for very high multiples. Instead of focusing on “gold 
nuggets” to compensate the failures, the issue here is primarily to sustain the activity for 
every project, by fetching buyers or investors that are able to sustain the project. One can say 
that the financing policy is prudent: Scientipole’s goal is to boost the distribution curve on 
near λ = 1 returns, instead of only promoting high returns. This enables reopening the 
portfolio of industrial investments (e.g. Muses, niche electric vehicles) and secondly 
significantly reduces risk. 
 
“External valuation” model: 
But the efforts of Scientipole initiative clearly reside on the external valorization of the 
projects: instead of trying to be competent on the core businesses of every start-up (which are 
all the more varied and ever-changing between Internet, automotive technologies, cultural 
events, etc.), the team encourages entrepreneurs to make frequent prototypes and discuss with 
buyers or potential clients. Rather than ensuring very high cash flows, the challenge is to 
secure the expansion potential that the projects may create for other companies. This 
translates into practice by contracts that focus less on the mathematical valuation of future 
cash flows (Net Present Value) when the fund sells its shares, than on the valuation for the 
ecosystem. Hence the importance of “accretion” mechanisms, which allow entrepreneurs to 
redeem some of the shares in their company, and thus capture a greater part of the value, if the 
market valuation for the company finally exceeds the expected offering price set at the first 
estimate (for the first round of investment) by contract between start-up founders and 
investors. 
 
So one can describe the model of Scientipole Initiatives as of a “prudent broker focusing 
on high external valuation”. Again, the main assumptions of the initial model of VC are 
challenged and a strong coupling with the innovation strategy appears. 
 
V.C. A model with minimal investment: Innovigo.com 
In some cases, the creation of a fund is compromised by the low probability of high 
return. When investment amounts in the sector are generally low, as it may be the case for 
Internet start-ups, then 2% of the funds raised are not sufficient to run a team of GPs. In these 
cases, some investors, such as Innovigo, adopt another strategy. 
 
Innovigo is a support structure in the highly specialized field of leisure services and 
tourism on the Internet. In this case, the field is highly specialized so one cannot assume 
anymore that the projects are independent. Instead of investing in start-ups, Innovigo chose to 
give them advice (selective advice) aiming at accelerating the business development in the 
niches with the highest potentials. The logic is basically the same as those of investment 
funds. Yet, the remuneration is very different and Innovigo builds experimentation and 
collective exploration devices by connecting start-ups with traditional businesses. 
- Innovigo is funded primarily by providing consultancy to large companies seeking to 
understand and follow new logics of consumption on the Internet. 
- In this context, these large companies accept to conduct experimentations for start-
ups : they test for instance the feasibility and usefulness of a specific data collection 
(e.g. customer online profiles for a hotel chain, etc.). 
- If start-ups, thanks to Innovigo support, achieve certain objectives (increase of 
turnover, etc.) then Innovigo is also compensated in equity thanks to stock options of 
equivalents. 
 
One can see that, as of Innobio, Innovigo leverages the ecosystem around Internet 
services in a particular domain. Interactions between large companies and start-ups enable 
identifying a “coupled” value, which literature had already highlighted. 
 
One can thus describe Innovigo’s model as coupling between a system of "venture 









Size of portfolio 
of investment 
projects 
High amount of total 
investment 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the classical model of venture capital seems to be built on problematic 
assumptions. These could partly explain the low returns observed so far. In particular: 
- The structure of compensation for funds management teams led to increase the invested 
amounts in each project, which is contrary to the principle of diversification of portfolios. 
- In addition, the statistical model is based on an assumption of frequency of "gold 
nuggets" to be high enough, which does not seem to be verified in practice. 
 
More generally, the statistical model does not take into account possible levers of 
innovation management. Yet, in fact, some funds clearly articulate their investment strategy 
on methods of innovation management. Our analysis reveals several possible variables for the 
coupled innovation-financing strategy: 
- Structuring of a field of innovation, 
- Insertion in an ecosystem 
- External valuation. 
 
Further research is required to validate these initial findings and to identify other models 
of coupling between investment and innovation. The research will include studying the 
conditions and modalities to increase the potential value of a start-up. 
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